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¶1 The current patent system in the United States, which provides patent holders with 
twenty-year monopolies on their inventions, is designed to balance the interests of 
inventors with those of the general public.1  In exchange for a twenty-year monopoly, a 
patent holder is required to publicly disclose the details of his or her invention.2  An 
important requirement of this disclosure is that it be made candidly and in good faith.3  In 
order to help ensure candor and good faith, an affirmative defense of “inequitable 
conduct” is available to defendants in patent infringement cases.4   
¶2 A finding of inequitable conduct, as has been firmly established in the Federal 
Circuit, requires a finding of both a material omission/misrepresentation and deceptive 
intent.5  The remedy associated with this finding, unenforceability of the original patent, 
has been referred to by some as an “atomic bomb.”6  Since the payout of a successful 
inequitable conduct defense is so significant, defendants in patent infringement cases 
habitually plead this defense in almost every case.7  The use of this defense has become 
so pervasive that it prompted Judge Nichols in Burlington Industries to refer to it as an 
“absolute plague . . . [whose proponents] destroy the respect for one another’s integrity.”8   
¶3 In August 2009, the Federal Circuit took a step toward fixing this situation in its 
Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. decision.9  This Note will examine whether the 
decision in this case, which established the “who, what, when, where, and how” standard 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2011.  The author would like to thank his 
wife Amy for her endless patience and understanding throughout his law school career. 
1 Craig Allen Nard, David W. Barnes & Michael J. Madison, THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 10 
(2d ed. 2008). 
2 Id. at 655–61. 
3 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2009) (stating that “[t]he public interest is best served, and the most effective patent 
examination occurs when, at the time an application is being examined, the [U.S. Patent and Trademark] 
Office is aware of and evaluates the teachings of all information material to patentability”). 
4 Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
5 Astrazeneca Pharms. LP v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 766, 770 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing 
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
6 Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1349 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“The threat of inequitable conduct, with its ‘atomic 
bomb’ remedy of unenforceability, ensures . . . candor and truthfulness”). 
7 Burlington Indus. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
8 Id. 
9 575 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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for inequitable conduct,10 will have any substantive effect on the widespread use of 
inequitable conduct as a defense to patent infringement claims.11   
¶4 Section II will examine recent developments in the Federal Circuit regarding 
inequitable conduct prior to Exergen.  Section III will take a closer look at the Exergen 
decision itself to determine the standard that it lays out.  Section IV will give a quick 
reaction to the new standard and outline what defendants in patent infringement cases 
should do when considering an inequitable conduct defense.  Section V will apply the 
Exergen standard to a previous case to see whether the ruling would have come out 
differently.  Section VI will look at the parallels between the standard and philosophy of 
the Exergen decision and the language used in Congress during the debates over the 
recently-proposed Patent Reform Acts.  Finally, Section VII concludes that, at a 
minimum, the Exergen decision sent a clear signal to the patent law community that the 
Federal Circuit is aware of the current trend of over-pleading inequitable conduct and 
will be applying heightened scrutiny to its inequitable conduct analyses.   
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT INEQUITABLE CONDUCT STANDARD 
A. Recognizing the Danger of Over-Asserting Inequitable Conduct Defenses 
¶5 Efforts have been made by the Federal Circuit in the past to combat the flood of 
inequitable conduct pleadings.  Notably, the Federal Circuit held in Burlington Industries, 
Inc. v. Dayco Corp. that a “summary judgment that a reputable attorney has been guilty of 
inequitable conduct, over his denials, ought to be, and can properly be, rare indeed.”12  In 
Burlington Industries, the patent in question involved the manufacture of an improved 
V-belt cover fabric.13  The controversy in the case centered on the use of the words 
“fiber” and “bundles.”14  The inventor understood that he had formulated a process that 
allowed a rubber polymer solution to impregnate individual fibers, while the patent 
attorney who prosecuted the patent understood that the process involved impregnating 
fiber bundles and encapsulating the individual fibers.15  The patent attorney claimed that 
he never knew that the application could be read as claiming an ability to impregnate 
individual fibers.16  In fact, the attorney had used the terms “fiber” and “bundles” 
interchangeably throughout the patent application.17  The distinction between the terms 
was material, because a claim of impregnating individual fibers avoided a prior art 
rejection which had occurred after the first application.18 
¶6 After reviewing the facts in the case, the Federal Circuit held that the patent 
attorney’s explanation “[w]hile not compelling, [does] represent the version of the facts 
 
10 Id. at 1327. 
11 See, e.g., Steven Seidenberg, Pleading Precedent: Inequitable Conduct Ruling May Alter the Patent 
Infringement Litigation Landscape, INSIDE COUNS., Nov. 2009, at 26; Charles A. Bieneman, What to Do 
About McKesson?, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Sept. 2009, at 14. 
12 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original). 
13 Id. at 1419. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id.  
17 Id. 
18 Id.  
 361
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 1 0  
 
most favorable to the nonmoving party,” thus making it inappropriate to find inequitable 
conduct on a summary judgment motion.19  This holding was further supported by the 
finding that the patent examiner, upon reading the interchangeable terms in the patent 
application, “ought to have been given pause by some of the claim language.”20 
¶7 Though the court did not wholeheartedly endorse the explanation provided by the 
prosecuting attorney, it did not hesitate to express its view on the use of inequitable 
conduct as a defense to a charge of infringement.  Maintaining that the use of inequitable 
conduct defenses had “become an absolute plague,” the court went on to charge that 
patent litigants who make unsupported charges of “inequitable conduct in the Patent 
Office” should view their actions as “a negative contribution to the rightful 
administration of justice.”21 
¶8 Later in 1988, the Federal Circuit handed down a decision in Kingsdown Med. 
Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc.22  The controversy in this case revolved around the 
resubmission of a previously rejected claim in a continuation application filed by 
Kingsdown.23  The device in question was a “two-piece ostomy appliance for use by 
patients with openings in their abdominal walls for release of waste.”24  In response to a 
35 U.S.C. § 112 rejection by the patent examiner, Kingsdown’s original patent prosecutor 
amended a claim in the patent application.25  When Hollister manufactured a similar two-
piece ostomy appliance, the original patent prosecutor engaged an outside counsel to file 
a continuation application.26  The outside counsel incorrectly resubmitted the previously 
rejected claim in the continuation application, renumbering it as another claim.27 
¶9 The Federal Circuit found that the mistake made by the outside counsel, though 
negligent, did not exhibit the required intent to justify a finding of inequitable conduct on 
the part of the attorney.28  The Federal Circuit also rejected the trial court’s conclusion 
that the outside counsel’s gross negligence justified a finding of the requisite intent for 
inequitable conduct.29  The court adopted the view that “a finding that particular conduct 
amounts to ‘gross negligence’ does not of itself justify an inference of intent to 
deceive.”30  Instead, they held that in order to find the requisite intent, “the involved 
conduct, viewed in light of all the evidence, including evidence indicative of good faith, 
must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive.”31  The 
Kingsdown court, like the court in Burlington, recognized “the present proliferation of 
inequitable conduct”32 as an “absolute plague” on the patent system.33 
 
19 Id. at 1422. 
20 Id. at 1421. 
21 Id. at 1422. 
22 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
23 Id. at 870–71. 
24 Id. at 869. 
25 Id. at 870. 
26 Id. 
27 Id.  
28 Id. at 873. 
29 Id. at 876. 
30 Id.; see also Rothman v. Target Corp., 556 F.3d 1310, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that gross 
negligence is not sufficient to show deceptive intent on the part of the patent owner). 
31 Kingsdown Med., at 876. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 876 n.15. 
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B. Recent Federal Circuit Cases That Have Found Inequitable Conduct on 
Questionable Grounds 
¶10 Despite its apparent recognition of the abuse of the inequitable conduct defense and 
the severity of the consequences associated with this abuse, the Federal Circuit has issued 
a number of opinions that would seem to encourage widespread use of this defense.34  
Because of this, there has been a great deal of criticism of the current inequitable conduct 
doctrine in the Federal Circuit, with many calling for a complete overhaul of the 
doctrine.35  Much of this criticism is warranted given many of the court’s recent 
decisions.36  Because the remedy associated with inequitable conduct—unenforceability 
of the patent—is so significant, courts should be very hesitant to find inequitable conduct 
unless there is a very strong case for it.  Therefore, there is a need for a strict standard for 
determining the existence of inequitable conduct.  In the Aventis and Hoffman-La Roche 
cases,37 the Federal Circuit did not hesitate to find inequitable conduct when faced with 
evidence of mistakes in the patent prosecution process.38  With its recent decision in 
Exergen, the Federal Circuit seems to be trying to solidify the standards for a finding of 
inequitable conduct in order to rein in the pleading of this defense.39 
III. EXERGEN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
A. District Court Decision 
¶11 The three patents at issue in this case are owned by Exergen and relate to infrared 
thermometers used to measure human body temperature.40  These were U.S. Patents No. 
5,012,813 (“’813”), No. 6,047,205 (“’205”), and No. 6,292,685 (“’685”).41  Exergen sued 
 
34 See Matthew M. Peters, The Equitable Inequitable: Adding Proportionality and Predictability to 
Inequitable Conduct in the Patent Reform Act of 2008, 19 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 77 
(2008) (citing, among other cases, Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1348–
49 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding intent to deceive the Patent and Trademark Office through omission of 
material dosage information in a comparison between two compounds, though the raw dosage information 
was included in a separate table); Hoffmann–La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1357–58 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding unenforceable a patent purchased by a third party when the court found that an 
experiment had been referred to in the past tense with some out-or-order steps in the patent application, 
despite the experiment working as written). 
35 See, e.g. Peters, supra note 34, at 117–18 (maintaining that the ultimate decision as to whether 
inequitable conduct has occurred should rest with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, which will 
determine appropriate penalties more creative than unenforceability of the patent in question); Benjamin 
Brown, Note, Inequitable Conduct: A Standard in Motion, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
593, 628 (2009) (maintaining that attorney’s fees should be awarded the patent holder upon a ruling of 
summary judgment against a party bringing an inequitable conduct charge); Nicole M. Murphy, Note, 
Inequitable-Conduct Doctrine Reform: Is the Death Penalty for Patents Still Appropriate?, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 2274, 2297 (2009) (developed a categorical approach to determining culpability in inequitable 
conduct cases, each with a different remedy for the associated level of inequitable conduct); Melissa 
Feeney Wasserman, Limiting the Inequitable Conduct Defense, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH 7 (2008) (maintaining 
that the draconian penalties associated with a finding of inequitable conduct should be limited to only those 
cases where there is a finding of behavior that rises to the level of common law fraud). 
36 See Peters, supra note 34. 
37 See discussion of these cases infra note 92. 
38 See Peters, supra note 34; see also discussion of both cases infra note 92. 
39 Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
40 Id. at 1316. 
41 Id. 
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SAAT (Wal-Mart’s codefendant), a manufacturer of thermometers that detect radiation 
from the skin that covers the temporal artery, for infringement of its patents related to 
infrared thermometers.42  SAAT answered Exergen’s infringement claim by asserting 
affirmative defenses and counter-claims of both noninfringement and invalidity.43   
¶12 SAAT initially neglected to assert an affirmative defense and counterclaim of 
inequitable conduct, but motioned to add this defense and counterclaim late in the 
litigation pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).44  The district court denied 
this motion, maintaining that the inequitable conduct pleading “failed to allege 
inequitable conduct with particularity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).”45  
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) states that, when “alleging fraud or mistake, a party 
must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake . . . [while] 
[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged 
generally.”46  The case proceeded to a jury trial on literal infringement, and the jury found 
for Exergen on every count, awarding damages of over $2.5 million.47  SAAT’s motion 
for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on the grounds of noninfringement, invalidity, 
and absence of lost profits was denied.48  SAAT appealed the denial of its motion for 
JMOL and the awarded damages to Exergen.49  Additionally, SAAT “appeal[ed] the 
denial of its motion for leave to amend its answer to allege that ‘813 and ‘685 patents 
[were] unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.”50 
B. Federal Circuit Opinion 
1. Development of Standards for Inequitable Conduct Pleadings 
 Prior to Exergen 
¶13  SAAT argued that the pleading standard for allegations of inequitable conduct 
should conform to the First Circuit’s “time, place, and content” test for the Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 9(b).51  The Federal Circuit specifically rejected this argument, noting 
that it applies its own law when determining whether an inequitable conduct charge has 
been plead with sufficient specificity.52  The court also indicated that there was some 
disagreement within the First Circuit as to the applicability of the “time, place, and 
content” test.53  The Federal Circuit recognized that, although inequitable conduct is a 
broader concept than fraud or mistake (which are both governed by Federal Rule of Civil 
 




46 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
47 Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1317. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 1316. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 1326 (SAAT cited McGinty v. Beranger Volkswagen, Inc., 633 F.2d 226, 228 (1st Cir. 1980) 
(holding that “[t]he clear weight of authority is that Rule 9 requires specification of the time, place, and 
content of an alleged false representation, but not the circumstances or evidence from which fraudulent 
intent could be inferred”)). 
52 Id. (citing Central Admixture Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiac Solutions, P.C., 482 F.3d 
1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
53 Id. (citing Alternative Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23, 29 (1st Cir. 2004)). 
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Procedure 9(b)), it is still governed by Rule 9(b) and therefore must be plead with 
particularity.54  In the end, the Federal Circuit in Exergen decided to apply the Seventh 
Circuit standard for a fraud allegation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) to the 
inequitable conduct pleading requirements.55   
¶14 In DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, the Seventh Circuit held that, in order to plead the 
circumstances of a fraud claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) with sufficient 
specificity, the pleading must include the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the 
circumstances surrounding the alleged fraud.56  The Federal Circuit adopted this standard 
in Exergen to determine whether the material omission/misrepresentation prong of an 
inequitable conduct claim has been pled with sufficient specificity.57 
¶15 The Exergen court also set forth standards for pleading and succeeding on the 
intent element of inequitable conduct.  Again, the court based its standard in part on the 
Seventh Circuit DiLeo case, holding that, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), a 
complaint “must still afford a basis for believing that plaintiffs could prove scienter.”58  
The Exergen court provided a cogent example of the strict standard that should be applied 
to the intent aspect of inequitable conduct pleadings when it described the holding in 
King Auto., Inc. v. Speedy King Muffler King, Inc.59   
¶16 In the King Automotive case, a trademark registrant filed a petition with the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office claiming that, “to the best of its knowledge,” no one had the 
right to use the trademark “SPEEDY MUFFLER KING.”  The case centered on an effort 
by that registrant’s competitor to cancel the mark.  The competitor alleged that the 
registrant’s statement about the use of the trademark was “known . . . to be untrue.”60  
The King Automotive court held that the competitor’s bald assertion that the registrant 
knew the trademark was confusing did not set forth the requisite underlying facts to 
support a finding of belief on the part of the registrant that the trademark was confusing.61 
¶17 After considering the standard set forth in Federal Circuit precedents as well as the 
DiLeo Seventh Circuit decision, the Exergen court held that  
a pleading of inequitable conduct under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 9(b) 
must include sufficient allegations of underlying facts from which a court may 
reasonably infer that a specific individual (1) knew of the withheld material 
information or of the falsity of the material misrepresentation, and (2) withheld 
or misrepresented this information with a specific intent to deceive the [U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office].62
 
54 Id. (citing Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls v. Mega Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 
2003)). 
55 Id. at 1327 (citing DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
56 DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990); see supra Section § III(B)(2)(b) for a 
detailed explanation of the test. 
57 Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1327. 
58 Id. at 1327 n.4 (quoting Dileo, 901 F.2d at 629). 
59 Id. at 1327 (citing King Auto., Inc. v. Speedy Muffler King, Inc., 667 F.2d 1008, 1011 (C.C.P.A. 
1981)). 
60 King Auto., Inc. v. Speedy Muffler King, Inc., 667 F.2d 1008, 1009 n.3 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
61 Id. at 1011. 
62 Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1328–29 (emphasis added). 
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In order to prevail on the merits of an inequitable conduct charge, the Exergen court held 
that an “accused infringer must prove both materiality and intent by clear and convincing 
evidence.”63  Furthermore, the Exergen court, referring to the Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. Federal Circuit decision, held that the “reasonable inference” 
mentioned above must be “the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from 
the evidence to meet the clear and convincing standard.”64
2. Application of the New Standards to the Exergen Facts 
a) Anticipation, Infringement, and Inducement to Infringe 
¶18 The Federal Circuit, while taking a hard stance on its standard for inequitable 
conduct, actually reversed the jury’s findings of inducement to infringe65 and actual 
infringement on the part of SAAT.66  The court noted that in order to find inducement to 
infringe, it would first have to find actual infringement.67  In addition to reversing the 
jury’s determinations on infringement, the Federal Circuit also reversed the jury’s finding 
that claims 1–5 of the ‘205 patent were not anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 4,602,642.68  
The court found that claim 1 was anticipated and that claims 2–5 were also anticipated, 
even though Exergen failed to present any separate argument as to the validity of these 
claims.69 
b) Application of the “who, what, when, where, and how” Materiality Standard 
¶19  The most significant aspect of the Federal Circuit’s holding in Exergen is the new 
standard that it imposed for findings of both the requisite materiality and intent elements 
of an inequitable conduct charge.  The court found SAAT’s pleadings regarding 
inequitable conduct were insufficient in that they failed to provide the “who, what, when, 
where, and how” of the alleged inequitable conduct.70 
¶20 With regard to the “who” of the new inequitable standard, the court found that 
SAAT failed to “name the specific individual associated with the filing or prosecution of 
the application issuing as the ‘685 patent, who both knew of the material information and 
deliberately withheld or misrepresented it.”71  The inadequate pleading to which this 
statement referred to were ¶¶ 40 and 43 of SAAT’s pleading: 
40. The ‘685 patent is unenforceable due to inequitable conduct by Exergen, its 
agents and/or attorneys during the prosecution of the application for the ‘685 
patent before the PTO. 
 
63 Id. at 1328 n.5 (citing Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008)). 
64 Id. (quoting Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1366) (emphasis in original). 
65 Id. at 1324–25. 
66 Id. at 1320. 
67 Id. at 1321. 
68 Id. at 1318. 
69 Id. at 1319–20. 
70 Id. at 1329–31.  
71 Id. at 1329. 
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43. Because Exergen was aware of the ‘808 patent and the ‘998 patent prior to 
the issuance of the ‘685 patent, Exergen had an opportunity to disclose each of 
these patents to the PTO during the prosecution of the ‘685 patent.  Moreover, 
because the ‘808 patent and the ‘998 patent were material to the patentability of 
the ‘685 patent, Exergen had an obligation to disclose each of these patents to the 
PTO.  Nevertheless, Exergen failed to cite either of these patents to the PTO 
during the prosecution of the ‘685 patent.  SAAT is informed and believes, and 
therefore alleges, that Exergen, its agents and/or attorneys intentionally withheld 
the ‘808 patent and the ‘998 patent from the PTO with the intent to deceive the 
PTO to issue the ‘685 patent.72
As the court pointed out, these two allegations merely pointed to Exergen as a party and 
“its agents and/or attorneys” without naming any individuals.  The court also noted that 
in order “to protect those whose reputation[s] would be harmed as a result of being 
subject to fraud charges,” the filings would be made under seal or other safeguards would 
be imposed to protect the identity of the individual.73
¶21 With regard to the “what” and “where” of the new inequitable conduct standard, the 
court found that the pleading “fail[ed] to identify which claims, and which limitation in 
those claims, the withheld references are relevant to, and where in those references the 
material information is found.”74  The inadequate pleading to which the court referred to 
was found in ¶¶ 41–42 of SAAT’s pleading: 
41. Prior to the filing of the ‘685 patent application, Exergen filed a patent 
application that ultimately issued as U.S. Patent No. 4,566,808 (hereinafter 
referred to as “the ‘808 patent”) on January 28, 1986.  Thus, Exergen was aware 
of the ‘808 patent well before the ‘685 patent issued on September 18, 2001.  The 
‘808 patent was material to the patentability of the ‘685 patent because it 
discloses a technique of scanning a radiation detector across a target to measure 
the maximum emitted radiation, and it is not cumulative to the information 
already of record in the prosecution history of the ‘685 patent. 
42. In addition, U.S. Patent No. 4,317,998 (hereinafter referred to as “the ‘998 
patent”) was cited in a Supplemental Information Disclosure Statement filed by 
Exergen on October 17, 1997 in connection with the prosecution of the ‘205 
patent.  Thus, Exergen was aware of the ‘998 patent well before the ‘685 patent 
issued on September 18, 2001.  The ‘998 patent was material to the patentability 
of the ‘685 patent because it discloses a technique of swiping a radiation detector 
across a target, and it is not cumulative to the information already of record in the 
prosecution history of the ‘685 patent.75
Because ¶¶ 41–42 referred only to the patents in general, and not to the specific claims 
contained within them, they failed to meet the specificity requirements of the Federal 
 
72 Id. at 1325–26 (emphasis added). 
73 Id. at 1329 n.6 (citing Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
74 Id. at 1329. 
75 Id. at 1325. 
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Circuit’s new standard.  This standard is, as the court notes, supported in Title 37 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations, which states that “[t]he duty disclose information exists 
with respect to each pending claim until the claim is cancelled or withdrawn from 
consideration.”76
¶22 With regard to the “how” of the new inequitable conduct pleading standard, the 
court found that SAAT failed in ¶¶ 41–42 and the rest of its pleading to “explain both 
‘why’ the withheld information is material and not cumulative, and ‘how’ an examiner 
would have used this information in assessing the patentability of the claims.”77  This 
failure was due to a lack of specificity as to which claims SAAT was alleging were 
“material” and “not cumulative” as stated in ¶¶ 41–42.78 
c) Application of the Standard for Intent in Inequitable Conduct Proceedings. 
¶23 Despite the fact that the Federal Circuit found SAAT’s pleadings of inequitable 
conduct to be factually deficient, which alone would be fatal under Rule 9(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court went on to examine whether the facts alleged 
established the intent requirement for inequitable conduct.79  Applying the standards 
taken from King Automotive, DiLeo, and Star Scientific, the Exergen court found that 
SAAT’s pleadings in ¶¶ 41–43, 46 were insufficient.80  Paragraph 46 of SAAT’s 
inequitable conduct pleading reads as follows: 
46. Thus, while Exergen acknowledged on its website that the temporal artery 
has a long history of temperature measurement, Exergen misrepresented to the 
PTO that no such history existed and omitted any reference to the website.  The 
misrepresentation and omission were material to the patentability of the ‘685 
patent because the information was not cumulative to the information already of 
record in the prosecution history of the ‘685 patent, and it refutes, or is 
inconsistent with, a position taken by Exergen in asserting an argument of 
patentability.  SAAT is informed and believes, and therefore alleges, that the 
misrepresentation and omission were made with the intent to deceive the PTO to 
issue the ‘685 patent.81
 
76 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2009) (emphasis added). 
77 Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1329–30. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 1330. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 1326.  ¶¶ 44–45 are provided here for context:  
 
44. In addition, during the prosecution of the ‘685 Patent application, Exergen made a 
number of arguments to the PTO to overcome rejections of the pending claims based 
upon various prior art references related to tympanic temperature detectors.  For example, 
in an Amendment filed on July 31, 2000, the following statements were made to the 
PTO: 
 
What was nonobvious . . . was that reliable temperature measurements could be obtained 
from the forehead by extending techniques initially developed for the tympanic 
membrane.  What had not been generally appreciated by those skilled in the art of 
temperature measurement was that the superficial temporal artery . . . provides an 
exceptionally reliable temperature reading. 
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When combined with ¶ 43, ¶ 46 bases its allegation of intent on mere “information and 
belief,” which is insufficient to pass the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) standards 
set forth by the Federal Circuit.82
¶24 Because SAAT merely alleged that Exergen was aware of the previous patents, 
without providing any factual basis for an inference “that any specific individual, who 
owed a duty of disclosure in prosecuting the ‘685 patent, knew of the specific 
information in the ‘808 and ‘998 patents,” the Exergen court found that the pleading did 
not meet the two-pronged standard83 for intent in an inequitable conduct charge.84  The 
court maintains this standard in order to prevent “inequitable conduct [from devolving] 
into ‘a magic incantation to be asserted against every patentee’ and its ‘allegation 
established upon a mere showing that art or information having some degree of 
materiality was not disclosed.’”85 
IV. AFTER EXERGEN  
A. Reactions to Exergen 
¶25 It is still unclear what effect the Exergen decision will have on the future of 
inequitable conduct pleadings in patent cases.  One effect that can be predicted with some 
clarity is that alleged infringers will no longer be able to plead inequitable conduct in 
general terms.86  The new “who, what, when, where, and how” materiality standard, 
combined with the affirmation of a two-pronged intent standard, should make general 
pleadings obsolete.  Thus, defendants in infringement suits will have to be very careful to 
base their inequitable conduct charges on specific facts.  In some cases, this would 
require a great deal of discovery.87  Also, “the commonly held practice of pleading 
deceptive intent ‘on information and belief’ may not pass muster unless the pleader states 
the ‘information’ on which it relies and the reasons for its ‘belief.’”88  The question 
remains, however, whether the newly required specificity will actually reduce the number 
of inequitable conduct pleadings.   
¶26 It is possible, as has been pointed out by some scholars, that defendants will merely 
push back their inequitable conduct charges until later in the litigation, after a great deal 
of discovery has been conducted.89  It is also possible that litigants will accelerate their 
 
 
45. These arguments made to the PTO were contradicted by statements from Exergen's 
own website, such as the following statement which appeared on the website at the time 
of the July 31, 2000 Amendment: 
The temporal artery area has a long history of temperature measurement, dating back to 
the early centuries before Christ with the first recorded references to palpation of the head 
for fever assessment. 
82 Id. at 1330. 
83 See supra § III(B)(1). 
84 Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1330. 
85 Id. at 1331 (quoting FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). 
86 Seidenberg, supra note 11; Richard H. Brown, Jonathan B. Tropp & Catherine Dugan O’Connor, 
Federal Circuit Closely Scrutinizes Inequitable Conduct Charges, THE METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., 
Sept. 2009, at 26; Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1329. 
87 Brown, supra note 35. 
88 Brown, supra note 35. 
89 Seidenberg, supra note 11.   
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discovery processes in order to gather the needed information to satisfy the Federal 
Circuit’s new standard for pleading inequitable conduct.90 
¶27 What seems most likely is that, at a minimum, defendants in patent infringement 
cases will be considerably more conservative in their use of the inequitable conduct 
charges.  The Federal Circuit has made it abundantly clear that it frowns upon frivolous 
use of inequitable conduct as a defense to infringement,91 despite some decisions that 
seem to indicate otherwise.92   
B. How Should Accused Infringers Proceed? 
¶28 The Federal Circuit sent a clear message to defendants in patent infringement cases 
when it raised the standard for pleading inequitable conduct: Don’t plead it unless you 
have a factual basis for doing so.  Otherwise, such defendants risk annoying or even 
angering the court with charges of inequitable conduct that will likely fail anyway.93  
¶29 The counterpoint to this assertion is that there remains the enormous incentive for 
defendants in patent infringement cases to bring charges of inequitable conduct—the 
potential for a finding of unenforceability of the patent.  In the case of inequitable 
conduct based upon fraudulent behavior, this remedy seems fair.94  In other cases, where 
inequitable conduct has been found when seemingly benign mistakes were made during 
patent prosecution,95 this remedy can be devastating and disproportionately harmful to 
patent holders.  Thus, it would be useful to examine a questionable decision that the 
Federal Circuit has made in this area in order to determine whether the Exergen standard 
would have prevented any of the court’s seemingly poor decisions. 
 
90 Seidenberg, supra note 11. 
91 See, e.g., Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(maintaining that inequitable conduct should only be found in the most extreme cases of fraud and 
deception); Burlington Indus. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding that the use of 
inequitable conduct as a defense to charges of patent infringement had become a plague on the system). 
92 See, e.g., Aventis, 525 F.3d. at 1348–49 (finding intent to deceive the Patent and Trademark Office 
through omission of material dosage information in a comparison between two compounds, though the raw 
dosage information was included in a separate table); Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp. 323 F.3d 
1354, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding unenforceable a patent purchased by a third party when the court 
found that an experiment had been referred to in the past tense with some out-or-order steps in the patent 
application, despite the experiment working as written). 
93 Burlington Indus., 849 F.2d at 1422 (stating that only a small percentage of cases “get anywhere” with 
the accusation of inequitable conduct).  
94 See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 35 (maintaining that the draconian penalties associated with a 
finding of inequitable conduct should be limited to only those cases where there is a finding of behavior 
that rises to the level of common law fraud). 
95 Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1351–52 (maintaining that the oversight made by a scientist assisting with the 
patent application process did not “rise to the level of intent to deceive” that would warrant an award of 
unenforceability of the patent). 
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V. EXERGEN ANALYSIS OF A RECENT, QUESTIONABLE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT DECISION: 
AVENTIS PHARMA S.A. V. AMPHASTAR PHARMS. INC.  
A. Application of the Exergen Pleading Standard 
¶30 This case was chosen for analysis due to popular recognition that it was poorly 
reasoned with regard to its inequitable conduct ruling.96  The controversy in this case 
centers on U.S. Patent No. 5,389,618 (“’618”), a patent for a drug called Lovenox®.97  
This drug is used to prevent blood clotting while minimizing the possibility of 
hemorrhaging.98  Amphastar and Teva (the codefendants) filed an Abbreviated New Drug 
Applications with the FDA, hoping to obtain approval for marketing a generic version of 
Lovenox®.99  Aventis sued Amphastar and Teva for patent infringement.100  Amphastar 
filed a counterclaim of inequitable conduct and moved for summary judgment on this 
counterclaim.101 
¶31 Amphastar’s counterclaim met the “who” requirement of the Exergen test by 
identifying Dr. André Uzan, a French chemist who had contributed his expertise in the 
patent application process.102  The counterclaim averred that Dr. Uzan had misrepresented 
the results of a half-life analysis of the Lovenox® drug by failing to state the dosage 
information used in the tests.103  This was especially pertinent in that the half-life 
comparison made between Lovenox® and the prior art was done using different dosages 
of each compound.104   
¶32 In making this accusation, Amphastar also appeared to meet the “what” and 
“where” standards of the Exergen test, identifying the specific claim that was at issue and 
the reference which should have been disclosed (the actual dosage information).  It 
should be noted, as Judge Rader points out in his dissent that the relevant dosage 
information was included in the patent application, just not in the half-life table.  
Therefore, it can be argued that Amphastar failed to plead correctly.105  Regardless of this 
discrepancy, it would appear that for the pleading stage, Amphastar had indeed met the 
“what” and “where” requirements. 
¶33 While it is clear that Amphastar met the “when” standard of the Exergen test by 
identifying Dr. Uzan’s specific “omission,”106 it is less clear whether Amphastar met the 
“how” requirement of the Exergen test.  If the dosage information had been completely 
withheld from the patent examiner, it is clear that this would have prevented the examiner 
from making a fully-informed determination as to the patentability of the half-life 
claim.107  Because the information was included in the attachments to the patent 
 
96 See Peters, supra note 34; see also discussion of both cases supra note 92. 
97 Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1337. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 1340. 
100 Id. at 1341. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id.  
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 1352. 
106 Id. at 1341. 
107 Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (setting forth that the 
“how” requirement applies to the way in which “an examiner would have used [the omitted] information in 
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application, it could be argued that Amphastar failed to meet the specificity requirement 
of the Exergen standard.  It is likely, however, that this discrepancy would not be fatal to 
meeting the Exergen standard for materiality in inequitable conduct pleadings.  Instead, 
this issue would be more appropriately addressed in the analysis of culpable intent. 
¶34 Thus, having concluded that Amphastar met the Exergen pleading requirements for 
materiality in an inequitable conduct charge, it is necessary to examine Amphastar’s 
justification for culpable intent on the part of Dr. Uzan.  Again, in order to meet the 
pleading requirements of the Exergen standard, the party alleging inequitable conduct 
must show that “a specific individual (1) knew of the withheld material information or of 
the falsity of the material misrepresentation, and (2) withheld or misrepresented this 
information with a specific intent to deceive the [U.S. Patent and Trademark Office].”108  
Amphastar clearly identified a specific individual, Dr. Uzan.  It also showed that Dr. 
Uzan knew of the allegedly omitted dosage information in that he was the one who 
produced and compiled the data.109 
¶35 Less clear, however, is whether Amphastar “include[d] sufficient allegations of 
underlying facts from which a court may reasonably infer that [Dr. Uzan] . . . (2) 
withheld or misrepresented this information with a specific intent to deceive the [U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office].”110  The district court found that the cumulative evidence 
relevant to deceptive intent outweighed Dr. Uzan’s testimony that he did not intend to 
deceive the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.111  This evidence of deceptive intent was 
1) that the dosage information was only included in raw data compilations, 2) the 
difference in half-life values for different dosages was not significant except in the case 
in which Dr. Uzan omitted the dosage information, and 3) that Dr. Uzan’s justifications 
for using certain dosages for half-life comparisons.112  As pointed out by Judge Rader in 
his dissent, the omission of dosage was “blatantly obvious,” making it much less likely 
that Dr. Uzan intended to deceive the patent examiner because he could have omitted the 
information in a much more subtle manner.113  Despite this point, it is likely that, at the 
pleading stage, Amphastar provided enough evidence with sufficient specificity to allow 
this issue to proceed in litigation. 
B. Application of Exergen’s Merit Standards 
¶36 Having shown that it is likely that Amphastar met the pleading standards set forth 
in Exergen, it is now necessary to determine whether Amphastar would have prevailed on 
the merits of its inequitable conduct charge.  With regard to materiality, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the dosage information was material to the patentability of 
the ‘618 patent.  Aventis attempted to use the half-life results obtained by Dr. Uzan to 
show that the Lovenox® was different in structure from the prior art introduced by the 
patent examiner in his rejection of the initial patent application.114  The dosage associated 
 
assessing the patentability of the claim[]”). 
108 Id. at 1328–29 (emphasis added). 
109 Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1341. 
110 Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1328–29 (emphasis added). 
111 Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1347–49. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 1352. 
114 Id. at 1338. 
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with both Lovenox® and the prior art had a direct effect on the half-life of each substance 
which, in turn, would call for different conclusions depending on the dosages compared 
between the two substances.115 
¶37 What is less clear is whether the Aventis court came to the proper conclusion 
regarding its finding of culpable intent on the part of Dr. Uzan.  As mentioned earlier, the 
Exergen court held that, in order for a charge of culpable intent to prevail, the reasonable 
inference suggested by the circumstances pled must be “the single most reasonable 
inference able to be drawn from the evidence to meet the clear and convincing 
standard.”116  The Aventis court seemed to base its finding of culpable intent on the 
overall materiality of the dosage omission, noting that the district court did take into 
consideration Dr. Uzan’s testimony when determining culpable intent.117   
¶38 Yet, as Judge Rader pointed out in his dissent, there was another, very plausible 
explanation for the omission of dosage information—inadvertent oversight.118  Judge 
Rader pointed out that the omission of the dosages was “blatantly obvious,” which should 
have immediately drawn the attention of the patent examiner.119  In addition, Dr. Uzan 
had an excellent reputation over the course of his fifty-year career, which should have 
created more skepticism regarding the conclusion that he intentionally misled the patent 
examiner.120  Because he was not even involved with the invention of Lovenox®, it 
seems very unlikely that he would have risked his reputation and career by purposely 
omitting relevant and material data from his work.121  It is difficult to determine whether 
the “innocent omission” explanation is more convincing than the conclusion reached by 
the Aventis court.  The Exergen/Star Scientific standard seems, however, to weigh against 
a finding of culpable intent when the issue is in doubt. 
VI. RECENT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 
¶39 Congressional efforts to reform the inequitable conduct standard in the modern 
patent system began in earnest when Senator Orrin Hatch introduced the Patent Reform 
Act of 2006.122  The Act would have restricted the use of inequitable conduct defenses to 
situations where at least one claim was found invalid.123  Though this bill failed to pass in 
the Senate, it was revived in 2007 as the Patent Reform Act of 2007 and is still alive as 
the Patent Reform Act of 2009.124 
¶40 In his address to the Committee on the Judiciary regarding the Patent Reform Act 
of 2007, Senator Patrick Leahy noted some of the changes to the system that were present 
in the Act.  One such change was that the U.S. system would conform to the first-to-file 
 
115 Id. at 1349. 
116 Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1329 n.5 (quoting Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 
1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original)). 
117 Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1347–48. 
118 Id. at 1351–52 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
119 Id. at 1352. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Murphy, supra note 35, at 2290–91. 
123 Id. at 2290. 
124 Id. at 2291. 
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system already in place in the rest of the world.125  Senator Leahy also noted that the 
Patent Reform Act of 2007 backed down from the language of the 2006 Act regarding 
inequitable conduct.  The Senator recognized that the Patent Reform Act of 2006 would 
have weakened the inequitable conduct doctrine and that, due to political opposition, this 
was dropped from the 2007 Act.126 
¶41 During the same proceedings, Senator Hatch expressed his “disappoint[ment] that 
the inequitable conduct provision from [the Patent Reform Act of 2006] was removed.”127  
He noted that it was universally recognized by attorneys that “the inequitable conduct 
defense has been overpleaded [sic] and has become a drag to the litigation process.”128  
Recognizing that there should be a remedy for inequitable conduct, Senator Hatch noted 
that “reforms to the inequitable conduct defense should focus on the nature of the 
misconduct and not permit the unenforceability of a perfectly valid patent on a 
meritorious invention.”129  Senator Hatch also criticized the way the materiality prong of 
inequitable conduct analysis had “become so inclusive that virtually anything now is 
portrayed as material.”130 
¶42 When introducing the Patent Reform Act of 2009 as a cosponsor, Senator Hatch 
again expressed his belief that the inequitable conduct doctrine must “sanction true 
misconduct and . . . do so in a proportional and fair manner,” which he believed was the 
original purpose of the doctrine.131  He noted that the other sponsors of the bill, Senators 
Leahy and Conyers, had agreed to incorporate changes into the inequitable conduct 
doctrine through the Patent Reform Act of 2009.132  These changes, according to Senator 
Hatch, have “the potential to single-handedly revolutionize the manner in which patent 
applications are prosecuted.”133 
¶43 At this point, potential acceptance of these changes seems promising, even if they 
don’t occur in the 111th Congress.  Senator Hatch seems optimistic that the changes will 
occur despite strong opposition from big pharmaceutical manufacturers.134  At the least, 
significant attention has been drawn to the issue, which will hopefully facilitate change 
through future reform acts if the Patent Reform Act of 2009 fails to pass.  As Senator 
Hatch said about the current system, “there is virtually no downside for the infringer to 
raise [inequitable conduct as a defense].”135  Real reform to the patent laws needs to occur 
to change this environment. 
 
125 153 CONG. REC. S4678, 4685 (2007). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 4691. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 4691–92. 
130 Id. at 3692. 
131 155 CONG. REC. 2706, 2715 (2009). 
132 Id. at 2716. 
133 Id. 
134 Diane Bartz, Sen. Hatch Says U.S. Patent Bill Will Pass, REUTERS, Mar. 18, 2009, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/smallBusinessNews/idUSTRE52H7W620090318. 
135 155 CONG. REC. 2706, 2715 (2009). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
¶44 While the precise scope and effect of the Exergen inequitable conduct standard 
remains to be seen, it is clear that it will force defendants in patent infringement cases to 
be more thorough in their pleadings of inequitable conduct.  This may ultimately help 
stem the “absolute plague” of inequitable conduct pleadings that has been the norm in 
patent proceedings.136  On the other hand, as observed earlier in this note, it may merely 
accelerate the discovery process in patent cases, further increasing the expense of patent 
litigation.137  After evaluating the Aventis decision, however, it would appear that at least 
some of the Federal Circuit’s findings of inequitable conduct would not have occurred 
with the Exergen standard in place. 
¶45 In addition, if Congress is able to come through with a significant reform of the 
Patent Act and its inequitable conduct doctrine, the scope of the Exergen standard will no 
longer matter.  Either way, reform needs to take place as soon as possible.  Considering 
that the remedy for inequitable conduct is so extreme, courts need to be very careful and 
conservative in its approach toward the issue, reserving inequitable conduct findings for 
“only the most extreme cases of fraud and deception.”138 
 
136 Burlington Indus. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
137 Seidenberg, supra note 11 (stating that the heightened pleading standard may merely push 
inequitable conduct pleadings into later stages of litigation, after significant discovery and fact-finding has 
occurred). 
138 Aventis Pharma, S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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